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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/07/2011 Accident number: 742 
Accident time: 10:25 Accident Date: 12/03/2011 
Where it occurred: Task: 
AF/1302/00342/MF585




Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 11/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
inadequate training (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACCA 
“Lessons Learned” document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original 
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formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group]-04 DEMINING ACCIDENT  
INTRODUCTION:  
Investigation team was convened by AMAC Kunduz to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MDG-04. A separate investigation team 
was also assigned by [Demining group] for internal investigation of this accident. The accident 
occurred at 10:25 hours, 12 Mar 2011 in task number AF/1302/00342/MF5857, located in 
Dood Kash village, Pulikhumri district of Baghlan province. 
SUMMARY: 
Task No AF/1302/00342/MF5857 is located on the top of hill, which had been contaminated 
with anti-personnel mines by Kaya Militias during 1992 to 1998. This area was mined by 
militia forces in order to protect their positions from the attacks of government forces. The 
terrain of area is hilltop and rocky.   
Presence of mines there posed a direct risk to the workers of coal mine and local people, 
therefore, they requested clearance of the site. This area was polygon surveyed by [Other 
demining group] in Feb 2009 with a size of 64000 sqm. According to [Demining group] 1389 
plan, clearance operations started there on 17 Feb 2011, [Demining group]-04 cleared 7640 
sqm and destroyed 6 PMN2 mines till accident time.  
According to external investigation report, the accident happened during the prodding 
operation on a detected signal. According to the witness statements the deminer may had 
been failed to pinpoint the signal or he may had started prodding directly from the top of it and 
not maintained the right angle of the prodder. The density of rocks there and hardness of the 
ground required more attention to be paid by deminer during the operation, but it seems that 
he was working in hurry without considering standard operating procedures to be applied 
during signal investigation. The record of QA shows that this team had not been visited by 
internal QA. Fortunately the deminer was dressed with PPE, so he got superficial injuries on 
his body and dust in his eyes.   
CONCLUSIONS: 
The accident happened due to inattention of deminer to standard operating procedure when 
he was investigating a detected signal.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The deminers should be briefed by command group about the worksite conditions and the 
obstacles in the task and advise them to be careful and follow the standard operating 
procedures. 
The command group of the teams should make sure that the deminers are well aware about 
the worksite conditions and taking due care during the operations. 
[Demining group] internal QA section is recommended to increase QA visits to the teams, find 
the shortfalls and recommend appropriate corrective/preventive actions.  
Refresher training is recommended to the team covering the use of detectors, pinpointing 
signals and prodding and excavation drills. 
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Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 
be submitted to the MACCA Operations department by no later than 7 days, effective to the 
issue date of this letter. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 933 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 




The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Inadequate training because the investigators 
found that the Victim had either not used his detector properly, not used the correct 
excavation procedures, or both. The secondary cause is listed as a Field control inadequacy 
because the field supervisors should have corrected these errors.  
The Inadequate investigation listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident report. 
The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years in 
contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible 
than the internationals with overall responsibility.  
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